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CHURCH, STATE AND CvIL SOCIETY. By David Fergusson. Cambridge
University Press 2004. Pp. 213. $24.99. ISBN: 0-521-52959-X.
David Fergusson, a member of the Church of Scotland, is a
Professor of Divinity at the University of Edinburgh. Church, State and
Civil Society is a revised edition of the 2001 Bampton Lectures
delivered at the University Church of St. Mary the Virgin in Oxford. Its
major thesis is that theology should move from what is, perhaps, an
over-pre-occupation with church-state issues (itself a kind of residue
from a medieval and early modem period where church and state
interpenetrated) to a more differentiated approach which understands the
church primarily in relation to a range of civil institutions within civil
society. Churches can continue to be socially significant without
aspiring to function as national or state institutions. Clearly, Fergusson
is not enamored of established churches.
In the new secular and religious pluralism which characterizes
modem societies, some theologians have seen the stark choices facing
the church variations on either withdrawal (following the Anabaptist
tradition of the church) or assimilation (what Gibson Winter once
referred to as "the suburban captivity of the churches"). For Fergusson,
whether one proceeds from scripture or theological argument, churches
have an obligation to promote the well-being of the societies in which
they are situated. They also retain important public functions. He sums
up his themes:
the separate though related functions under divine providence of
church and state; the promotion of the common good by both
ecclesial and civil bodies; the necessary interaction of the church
with the institutions of civil society; the derivation of political
authority from God and its necessary acknowledgement by the
consent of those living under its jurisdiction; the dignity of
political office; and the recurring injunction to seek the welfare of
the city and to offer it critical support. (116)
Assimilation threatens a loss of evangelical and catholic identity;
withdrawal evades an ineluctable duty to seek the welfare of the city
under fidelity to God.
The initial chapter, "The politics of scripture," reminds us that
early Christianity's conception of the church in society was rooted in a
long Jewish tradition of being a diaspora. Even in Babylon, Jews
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struggled both to maintain their religious identity yet still accommodate
the concerns of the state and civil society. For Fergusson, a key text is
Jeremiah 29:7 with its insistence that the exiles "seek the welfare of the
city where I have sent you into exile and pray to the Lord on its behalf,
for in its welfare you will find your welfare." (7) Early Christianity,
unlike some Jewish sects of Jesus' time, opted neither for complete
withdrawal (e.g The Essenes), nor for political resistance or complete
assimilation. It recognized secular authority as deriving from God,
mandating a real, if provisional, loyalty to Roman authority. Romans 13
minimally presents a low-key, qualified yet still positive account of the
capacity of the civic realm to fit into the purposes of God. To be sure,
the politics of Jesus (looking to a different kind of polity which reflects
the eschatological Kingdom of God) serves to challenge current
arrangements and demands, in its controversial assertion of the right to
articulate its different vision for social life-even if it can be embodied,
in anticipation, only in the church. The politics of Jesus never lends
itself easily to Christianity's serving as "the civil religion" of any state.
(10)
A chapter which deals with theological traditions concerning
church-state-civil society reminds us that there is no pervasively
coherent Christian account of citizenship. Philippians 3:20 may speak
of "an alien citizenship," (24) but it would be preferable to speak of a
stratified citizenship or one subordinated to the primacy of God's rule
rather than a simply alien identity. Some early Christian theologians
(e.g. Augustine) and some of the Reformers (e.g. Luther) tended,
following Romans 13, to limit the state to exercising its restraining
ordinance (to ward off sin and evil). In our own time, many
Evangelicals continue this tradition. Yet in Aquinas and Calvin, there is
a wider sense of the capacity of the state to promote social goods and in
its own real and limited way to anticipate divine rule. Aquinas' notion
of the common good expresses an underlying conviction that the end of
each person can be fulfilled only where a range of social goods is
realized. The church is no longer to be related only to the monarch
(whose legitimate rule is indeed subject to his promoting the common
good) but to a web of social groups, organizations and institutions. In
Thomist thought, the state has no monopoly in defining or enacting the
common good. For his part, Calvin was interested not only in serving
God in the secular realm (Luther's legacy) but actually transforming that
realm in a more Godly direction. Unlike the Anabaptists who saw the
social role of the church as primarily a Godly counter-cultural witness,
Calvin, like Thomas, sought a social theology which conceived of the
[Vol. XXI
BOOK REVIEW
rule of God not merely through ecclesial forms.
A chapter on the crises of liberalism serves as a kind of excursus.
Fergusson agrees with critics who reject the liberal thesis (as found in
the work of Rorty, Rawls, Dworkin, Berlin) that the state must be
neutral about all particular conceptions of the good and only pursue
procedural fairness. In point of fact, every state faces decisions which
privilege one variant of the good over rivals. Liberalism, moreover,
relies on what has come to be called "the unencumbered self' which
makes any shared or common goods impossible a priori. (59) Liberal
individualism downplays the role of embedded selves or any legitimate
claims to group rights or representation. As a result, it creates a kind of
"establishment" which privatizes, trivializes or marginalizes the
religious voice. (61) Religious people, in this view, are always
constrained to make any public case in an alien language. Fergusson
turns to more communitarian voices, such as Charles Taylor, to argue
instead for a politics of recognition where one acknowledges the reality
of communal identities. In place of a mere trading and trimming (using
a utilitarian calculus or seeking a lowest common denominator), the
church (constrained to speak and act in the public realm in fidelity to its
beliefs) can form alliances and make common cause with other voices
and perspectives. As in social Catholicism, Fergusson opts for a multi-
lingual moral fluency which allows religious voices to construe their
proposals for civic policy in both theological and secular warrants.
Drawing on the writings of Erasmus and the Geneva Reformer
Sebastian Castellio, Fergusson argues that mere tolerance, in itself, is
never enough-not itself a pursuit of the common good. But a
theological case for religious toleration can be construed around the
following major motifs: the example of Christ and his followers; the
legitimate limits of state power in enacting the common good; the
irrationality of coercion; the sanctity of each person's sincere
conscience; the need for peace, social cohesion and the promotion of
civil conversation among those who differ in order to approach a greater
approximation to God's truth (on the indubitable assumption that God is
at work in other religions and even in secular movements).
Fergusson claims in an argument akin to Tocqueville's that the
main sociological function of the churches in service of state and society
consists in moral formation. Congregations serve as the schools of
virtue (including virtues necessary for civil flourishing) for any
democratic polity needs. Fergusson's argument here resonates closely to
that of Stanley Hauerwas but he seems firmer than Hauerwas on the
ineluctable duty of seeking the welfare of the city and on the positive
4351 437
JOURNAL OF LA W & RELIGION
contribution that secular authority can make in approximating and
embodying elements of the Kingdom of God. Unlike Hauerwas,
Fergusson has a notion not only of discipleship but citizenship. Not by
chance, then, in a chapter contrasting the Barmen Declaration and the
Vatican II document on "The Church in the Modem World," Fergusson
veers closer to the Catholic case based on subsidiarity, solidarity and the
common good.
For this reviewer, the thesis that the churches can continue to play a
public role, not through the state or nation but through a ramified web of
civic organizations within civil society, is quite persuasive. I would
have liked, however, some specific appeal to case studies of how this
actually works (e.g. by looking at the role of churches in community
organizing or interfaith and religious groups in social movements of
reform). I would have also liked a chapter explicitly delimiting a
Christian theory of citizenship. This learned and readable book,
however, is more a theological account of how, eschewing both
withdrawal or accommodation, and, without compromising its integrity,
the church can and must (with a theological account of that must) not
only work with others for the welfare of the city but also bring religious
concepts such as forgiveness and reconciliation, respect and true
dialogue to the secular realm.
John A. Colemant
t S.J., Casassa Professor of Social Values, Loyola Marymount University, Los Angeles,
Los Angeles, California.
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THAT GODLESS COURT?: SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON CHURCH-STATE
RELATIONSHIPS. By Ronald B. Flowers. 2d. ed., Westminster John Knox
Press 2005. Pp. 240. Paper. $24.95. ISBN: 0-664-22891-7.
In the last decade, American constitutional jurisprudence has
become increasingly fractured and fractious. Principles that have been
mainstays of constitutional law for half a century or more have been cast
into doubt by a new generation of judges, who have undertaken the
project of revamping virtually every aspect of constitutional law. Of all
the areas of federal constitutional law that have been cast into flux by
the changing composition of the federal judiciary, the doctrine regarding
the relationship between church and state has become the subject of
some of the most contentious battles. It is also one of the areas most
prone to an impending radical transformation. The country is poised on
the brink of a brave new world in the constitutional law of church and
state, and the general public has not even begun to understand the
potential consequences of the transition from the old world to the new.
Ronald Flowers has entered this volatile field with a new edition of
a book that has long been one of the best generalist overviews of this
area of constitutional law. Professor Flowers is an emeritus professor of
religion at Texas Christian University, and has published extensively in
this area. He is from the old school of church-state jurisprudence, which
is to say that he still takes the Madisonian separationist ideal seriously.
This puts him at odds with the new wave of judges and scholars, who
are systematically dismantling the wall that Madison, Jefferson, and
their successors patiently erected over two centuries.
Flowers's perspective is both the main strength and the main
weakness of his book. It is a strength in that Flowers conscientiously
reminds the reader of the various ways in which the ideal of religious
liberty has always been tied closely to the prevalence of religious
diversity within the framework of a secular government. He also
reminds the reader of how tortuous the process of achieving that ideal
has been. On the other hand, Flowers's perspective is a weakness in that
the structure and details of the book are dictated by the separationist
themes that have dominated the Court's church-state decisions during
the last fifty years, but are now being eclipsed by systematic (and often
wrong-headed) challenges from the ideological right.
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At several points in his narrative, Flowers explicitly recognizes the
clouds on the horizon, but he cannot quite bring himself to confront
directly the prospect that in many areas of church-state doctrine, the
Court may soon abandon the traditional Madisonian notion of religious
liberty in favor of a regime defined by religious majoritarianism. Under
this new regime, the government will be allowed to embrace the
symbols and ideals of the religious majority and finance overtly
religious activity with government funds. Flowers repeatedly criticizes
some of the implications of the new religious majoritarianism, and
harshly critiques the cases that serve as the foundation of the new
regime, but he does not engage in the debate at a deeper, theoretical
level. If the Madisonian project is going to survive the current attacks,
Flowers and other defenders of the separationist ideal must confront in a
sophisticated way the deeply problematic theories of democracy and
religious liberty that lie behind the new interpretations of the First
Amendment.
It is on the level of the specific and the concrete that Professor
Flowers's book is most useful. In this edition of his book, as in the first
edition, Flowers comprehensively surveys the many different variations
on the theme of church and state. He includes a very good brief
synopsis of the domestic history of church and state, both before and
after the adoption of the Constitution. In the sections dealing with the
modem era, he covers the full range of both Establishment and Free
Exercise Clause decisions, as well as related statutes such as the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The book is intended to appeal to a
nonspecialist audience, so he also includes a brief description of the
Supreme Court's operation and its role in adjudicating church-state
issues. In sum, Professor Flowers's treatment of the entire range of
church-state topics is sufficiently sophisticated to appeal to lawyers and
academics in subjects relating to law and religion, as well as members of
the general public.
Professor Flowers's discussion of specific cases is divided into four
broad subject areas. He begins by addressing cases involving the free
exercise of religion. He then proceeds to discuss three different types of
Establishment Clause cases, involving the state financing of religious
activity, the injection of religion into public schools, and the
governmental endorsement of religion outside the school context. In
each of these areas, Professor Flowers provides a very helpful overview
of the relevant case law. Readers of the entire text will come away with
a broad understanding of the trajectory of constitutional law relating to
church and state, and also will have enough information to provide a
[Vol. XXI
BOOK REVIEW
starting point for further research on specific cases.
The only quibble that can reasonably be mustered about Professor
Flowers's treatment of the specific cases is the sharp disjunction
between his discussion of the traditional cases and the more recent cases
that announce the new era in church-state case law. In his discussion of
the free exercise cases, for example, Professor Flowers offers a brief
summary of all the most important cases from the early part of the
twentieth century, then shifts gears abruptly with a discussion of the
Supreme Court's 1990 decision in Employment Division of Oregon v.
Smith.1
As Professor Flowers notes, Smith marks a major turning point in
the Court's treatment of free exercise issues. In Smith, the Court
abandoned the requirement that the government must demonstrate a
compelling interest whenever it substantially burdens religious activity,
in favor of a standard that allows the government to impose laws of
general applicability on everyone in society, including those acting on
the basis of religious convictions. Professor Flowers is not happy with
this turn of affairs, labeling the Smith decision "disastrous" (44) and
noting that the abandonment of the compelling interest analysis dealt
religious freedom "a virtually devastating blow." (50)
Professor Flowers's unhappiness is understandable, and is shared
by many people (including representatives of many traditional religious
groups). But there are three problems with Professor Flowers's
discussion of Smith. First, his discussion of the pre-Smith cases neglects
to highlight the inconsistencies between the Court's articulation of a
very protective standard and its frequent refusal to enforce that standard
in particular cases. In theory, Smith was a major deviation from the
norm; in practice, it may not significantly have changed the way the
courts actually resolve church-state disputes.
Second, Professor Flowers treats the pre-Smith standard as an
unfettered victory for religious liberty, although several of the cases
Flowers discusses raise troubling questions of religious favoritism that
potentially conflict with the Establishment Clause dictate that the
government must remain neutral with regard to religion. It is not
altogether clear, for example, that it was a victory for religious liberty
when the Supreme Court allowed members of the Amish community to
deny their children formal education beyond junior high school. From
the perspective of at least the more adventurous and intellectually
curious children, their liberty might have been fostered by permitting
1. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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them to consider religious and secular perspectives other than the one
their parents preferred.
The third problem with Professor Flowers's account of the free
exercise cases is his failure to link Smith with the recent attacks on the
separation principle in the Establishment Clause area. Ironically, the
same group of conservative judges who are eliminating protections of
religious practitioners from state regulation are also in favor of allowing
the political and religious majority to use their influence over
government to advance their own religious ideals. These two trends-
reducing the protections of both the Free Exercise and Establishment
Clauses-are part of the same agenda of religious majoritarianism, and
the book's criticisms of the modem Court would be more effective if
these linkages were made more explicitly.
The quibbles with Professor Flowers's treatment of the three main
areas of Establishment Clause jurisprudence are largely a function of the
timing of the book's publication. This book is being published before
the counterrevolution in Establishment Clause jurisprudence is
complete, so the book sometimes takes on a schizophrenic tone-
treating the remaining areas of strongly separationist doctrine as if they
were consistent with those areas that now reflect the rising ideology of
religious majoritarianism. In the section dealing with government
financing of religion, for exemple, the final five pages deal with three
recent cases in which the Court has permitted both direct and indirect
government aid to religious schools. But this discussion comes after a
twenty-four page description of cases in which such aid was largely
prohibited or strictly limited. Although Professor Flowers
acknowledges the shift in the Court's approach, it will not be
immediately evident to the lay reader that the recent cases have in effect
overruled much of the case law carefully described in the first part of the
chapter. Nor will it be immediately evident to those not already familiar
with the area that the new cases are based on a radically different view
of religious liberty than the fifty years of jurisprudence that preceded
them.
This disjunction between the old and the new is less evident in the
other two Establishment Clause sections. The section on government
endorsement of religion outside the school context suffers from the fact
that the book does not include the newest cases on the Ten
Commandments. The discussion in this section will probably age
quickly in light of Justice O'Connor's departure from the Court. Justice
O'Connor was the fifth vote in favor of retaining fairly substantial limits
on the government's authority to endorse religious ideas and symbols.
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Her replacement by another conservative will undoubtedly lead to major
changes in this area of Establishment Clause doctrine.
The section dealing with religion in public school, on the other
hand, is the strongest Establishment Clause section, mostly because this
is the area in which the Court has itself been the most consistent. This
section is also least likely to be outdated quickly. In recent years,
Justice Kennedy has refused to vote with the other conservatives to
remove Establishment Clause protections in the school cases, so Justice
O'Connor's departure from the Court will not have the same dramatic
effect in the school cases as it will in other areas of Establishment
Clause doctrine.
None of the criticisms stated above should in any way detract from
the many positive attributes of Professor Flowers's book. It borders on
the churlish to criticize a book that manages so successfully to
summarize such a complex and contradictory area of law for such a wide
audience. Unfortunately, we will probably be living in a very different
country five years from now than the one described in That Godless
Court? Thus, the story Professor Flowers has told about the
Establishment Clause may be eclipsed very quickly as the new
appointees to the Supreme Court begin adjudicating Establishment
Clause cases.
Viewed pessimistically, the country we are moving toward will be
one with less religious liberty, escalating religious divisiveness, and a
greatly increased infusion of the political majority's religious values into
law, especially at local and state levels in religiously homogenous areas
of the country. The Madisonian fortress Flowers is defending has
already been breached. When the time comes for a third edition of this
necessary book, Professor Flowers will need to take a different tack than
that taken in the present edition. By that point the counterrevolution in
Religion Clause jurisprudence will be nearing its apogee, and it will be
necessary for Professor Flowers and others who still cherish the legacy
of Madison and Jefferson to aggressively-and even caustically-
defend the cause of religious liberty against those who are moving just
as aggressively to renounce it.
Steven G. Geyt
t David and Deborah Fonvielle and Donald and Janet Hinkle Professor, Florida State
University College of Law, Tallahassee, Florida.
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BLESSING SAME-SEX UNIONS: THE PERILS OF QUEER ROMANCE AND THE
CONFUSIONS OF CHRISTIAN MARRIAGE. By Mark D. Jordan. University of
Chicago Press 2005. Pp. x + 258. $29.00. ISBN: 0-226-41033-1.
The subtitle of Jordan's book clues the reader into his two principal
arguments, namely that the current debates about same-sex marriage are
rampant with confusion not only about the "tradition"-the history and
theology-of Christian marriage, but also with confusion among gays
and lesbians about what kind(s) of queer unions, if any, are desirable or
fitting. Jordan's argument is a complex one. In fact, if one reads the
first few chapters and then jumps to the Epilogue, the first line will seem
confusing: "Christian churches should bless same-sex unions."(206) For
didn't the first chapters, one after another, inveigh against the rush
among gays and lesbians to ape commercially created, theologically
empty other-sex marriage rituals masquerading as Christian? But
Jordan's Epilogue continues:
They [Christians] should do it [recognize same-sex marriage] as a
matter of justice, after reading the signs of the times, with
prayerful enthusiasm for the Gospel, and by way of securing some
credible future for their marriage theology.
For Jordan, the current controversy over same-sex unions offers the
Christian churches an opportunity to deal with the dysfunctional, unjust,
and fundamentally un-Christian set of codes, customs and ceremonies
that we call Christian marriage today. Just as lesbians in the women's
movement were often the radicals pushing the movement to re-examine
unequal gender norms, so marginalized gays and lesbians who demand
Christian marriage make crystal clear the bankruptcy of the tradition and
its exclusions.
Christian theologians, beginning with the New Testament, argued
that the principal justification of marriage was the avoidance of sin:
those who were not morally strong enough to be celibate needed a
morally acceptable sexual outlet. Jordan demonstrates that bishops and
theologians continuously intervened for over a millennium and a half in
marital sex to regulate when couples could have sex, in what positions,
and with what intentions, because the true Christian ideal was celibacy.
For Christians, concessions to sexual desire should be minimized as
much as possible. This, Jordan reminds us, is the historical Christian
tradition that is absent in the accounts of those Christians who would
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"protect" Christianity from queer corruption and save the "traditional
Christian family tradition." He unmasks the de-sexualizing of marriage
in Christianity, and suggests that the (sinful) sex that was crushed out of
marriage was then projected onto adulterers and fornicators, the most
demonized of whom were queers, who represented and still represent
unregulated and undomesticated sex. Much of the horror in those who
oppose queer unions is precisely a fear of untamed sex. More precisely,
theirs is a fear of losing the justification for distinguishing good sex and
bad sex. Labeling all marital sex acceptable and all non-marital sex
immoral makes no demands on people to develop a conscience. It does
not require us to examine the sex itself-how consensual, how
affectionate, how respectful it is. To marry gays and lesbians might
mean that we could no longer decide sexual morality based solely on the
legal status of persons, but might have to examine all sexual
relationships for violence, abuse and lack of respect.
Jordan realizes that in the last few hundred years Christianity has
been moving away from this celibate ideal (though this shift did not
begin as early as many Protestants assume). There is a certain historical
irony at work here, in that during the many centuries when depopulation
was a constant local and regional threat due to famines, wars and
epidemics, the Christian ideal was celibacy, and sex in marriage, while
required to be aimed at procreation, was limited in numerous ways.
During the modern demographic transition, after death rates around the
world decreased due to improved sanitation and epidemic control and
birth rates took decades (South America) to centuries (Europe and the
U.S.) longer to drop, population densities exploded. Due to a different
set of new conditions during this period of population explosion,
Christian churches ended both their regulation of marital sex and their
penalties for non-marital sex. It was only in the mid-twentieth century,
faced with a fait accompli among members, that churches began
approving various forms of contraception. Given this history, there is no
basis for the arguments that marriage is centered on procreation, or that
the establishment of families is the foundation of the church itself. On
the contrary, the Christian church was, for most of its history, a
theological alternative to the natural family in which all the members
were brothers and sisters of the same Almighty Father, and younger
siblings of Jesus himself.
At least half of Blessing Same-Sex Unions concerns the debates
within gay and lesbian communities, which Jordan describes as
constituting a broad range, from those who buy into the entire
contemporary other-sex wedding package-from wedding planners to
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permanent vows-to those who reject any form of stable unions,
whether permanent or not, as aping other-sex norms and customs.
Jordan's critique of contemporary U.S. wedding customs is acute.
Anyone who has put on one of these affairs, for themselves or their
children, will be embarrassed to realize in Jordan's analysis just how
much they had been brainwashed by the commercialized "romance" of
weddings, even without the wedding planners Jordan so ridicules.
Jordan leaves the reader convinced that the issue before the
Christian churches is not whether to admit gay and lesbian couples to the
ranks of those sanctified in holy matrimony. Rather, the issue is one of
seriously considering the nature and meaning of marriage itself. What is
it for? How desirable are children within marriage? How does
marriage-if it does-sanctify us? Is it possible/desirable for marriage
to be permanent? Is it necessary for marriage to be sexually exclusive?
We should look at the marriages around us-the many marriages
without children, the many that are not sexually exclusive, and the many
that end in divorce. Jordan insists that when we connect this reality to
the realization that the norms so long lifted up for Christian marriage
were designed by churchmen whose ultimate goal in regulating and
limiting sex was to strengthen Christians so that sex and marriage were
not necessary, we will realize the need to rethink marriage. That
rethinking, he suggests, will involve returning to the Gospel for the
vision of the kind of persons that Christians should be. It will require
consulting sacramental theology and ritual studies, and it will need to
examine at great depth the variety in human sexual desire and human
sexual relationships. And it will need to include some comedic satire.
Jordan does not pretend to resolve all of the very real issues lurking
under the debates on same-sex unions. Throughout the book, he
periodically frames parts of his argument as a comedy of manners, as in
his treatment of weddings and wedding planners, or his treatment of the
relationship of camp to liturgy. Some of his last words in the book
revisit this theme:
Can comic opera possibly be enough? No other genre will do,
either for queer romance or Christian marriage. Camp is the
condition of queer critique-and of Christian liturgy. Every
serious theology laughs at itself. (207)
This reminder is important. Any new theology of marriage will be a
kind of floating island, subject to transformation from a huge variety of
variables. Theologies of marriage are not alone in this, of course.
Christians have been long accustomed to thinking that there was in the
Bible, in nature, or in the historical tradition of the church, a firm
445]
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foundation for norms of all kinds which only needed to be tweaked a
tiny bit in order to "fit" with the demands of the times. Many Christians
in the pews are desperately holding on to the remnants of this
assumption, which has been under attack by scholarship, both religious
and secular, during the last decades. Jordan reminds us that on marriage
and sex, the Bible gives little guidance, that historical ecclesial tradition
on sex/marriage has been implicitly disavowed by the churches for a
century or more, and that human sexual desire seems similarly subject to
construction and reconstruction. He similarly wants us to acknowledge
that there is a huge range in sexual relationships that seem effective in
creating interlocking friendships and communities in which persons
speak each other into free, just and loving persons. While this view may
be disconcerting for those seeking bedrock, it may harbor good news for
those who have been persecuted under the traditional norms.
Christine E. Gudorft
t Professor and Chair, Department of Religious Studies, Florida International University,
Miami, Florida.
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LA WAND RELIGION IN POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE. Edited by Silvio Ferrari,
W. Cole Durham, Jr. and Elizabeth A. Sewell. Law and Religion Studies 1.
Peeters 2003. Pp. iv + 428. Paper. $50.00. 45 Euros. ISBN: 9-042-
91262-6.
LAWS ON RELIGION AND THE STATE IN POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE. Edited by
W. Cole Durham, Jr. and Silvio Ferrari. Law and Religion Studies 2.
Peeters 2004. Pp. xliii + 330. Paper. $72.00. 65 Euros. ISBN: 9-042-
91362-2.
What is the new relationship between church and state in Central
and Eastern Europe? Law and Religion in Post-Communist Europe
gives an intelligent and measured answer in seventeen carefully-wrought
country studies. (Russia receives two chapters; there are also
introductory and concluding chapters). Laws on Religion and the State
in Post-Communist Europe supplements the first volume, reproducing
and analyzing many of the key national laws. The two volumes are the
initial members in a series, Law and Religion Studies, published under
the auspices of the European Consortium for Church and State
Research.1
As the editors, Silvio Ferrari of the University of Milan and W.
Cole Durham, Jr. of Brigham Young University, point out in their
Preface (5-6):
after decades of official atheism suddenly religion has become a
factor to be seriously taken into account in any field of the public
domain. Every country in the former Communist bloc has
experienced major changes in the laws governing religion and the
state.
The introductory chapter, by Giovanni Barberini of the University of
Perugia, sets the stage by putting the new developments in church/state
relations in the general context of the process of democratization of
Central and Eastern Europe. (7-21) Barberini submits that moving
Central and Eastern Europe to a "standard of broad religious freedoms"
is "a transition that is all but complete." (7) Dating the beginning of the
transition to 1975 and the Helsinki Act, he gives principal credit to the
1. Except for one mention of the second volume below, all page references, quotations, and
remarks relate to the first volume.
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Vatican for insisting during the negotiations that the Act's embrace of
human rights include the freedom of conscience, religion, and belief.
Barberini calls the Vatican's insistence "an extremely important moment
because it helped to set in motion the evolution that progressively
affected all of Europe that lived under a Marxist-Leninist ideology." (8)
After reminding us that neither history nor Marxism-Leninism treated
the region's different countries uniformly, Barberini provides a useful
summary comparison of constitutional norms, registration and
regulatory norms and agreements relating to church/state relations.
It is unlikely that many readers will approach the two books as a
single "read." More likely, the two volumes will be useful as a
storehouse, valuable either as a source for individual country studies or
for researching a specific aspect of church/state relations. The country
studies are, with one exception, ordered alphabetically: Albania,
Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Ukraine, and the former German Democratic Republic.
Let me look in detail at just one of the country studies, Latvia, to
give the reader an idea of what will be found here. The Latvian chapter,
(141-175) entitled "Church and State in Latvia," by Ringolds Balodis of
the University of Latvia, is structured in categories similar to those used
in the other country studies. The Latvian chapter, along with the others,
provides a very valuable compendium:
1. Historical Background. (141-149) Latvia became a state only
in 1918. The region it now encompasses was conquered and inhabited
by many peoples and for a long time has been multi-confessional. The
Latvian Baltic folk religion, Dievturiba, was a form of Indo-European
paganism, comparable to the mythology of ancient Greece and Rome.
German crusaders introduced first Catholicism and then Lutheranism to
the territory. Neighboring Russia brought the Orthodox faith. After
centuries of German domination, Sweden conquered Riga and the
surrounding area in 1621, banning Catholicism and enforcing
Protestantism. The southern region of Latgale, however, fell to Poland
which converted their subject population to Catholicism. When Russia
conquered Latvian territory in the 1 8th century, it tried, mostly
unsuccessfully, to impose Russian Orthodoxy. In 1918, the Tsarist
Empire fell and Latvia became a state, conglomerating the Lutheran
provinces, Vidzeme, Kurzeme, and Zemgale, and Catholic Latgale. In
its first independent period, 1918-39, Latvia was committed to religious
tolerance. Communist Russian occupation (1945-90), though hostile to
religion, did not extinguish Latvia's multi-confessional tradition. In
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2001, in a population of less than three million, Latvia counted three
large denominations: Roman Catholics (500,000), Lutherans (350,000),
and Orthodox (250,000), and twenty-nine smaller denominations of
which the three largest were: Old Believers (70,000), Jews (15,000), and
Pentecostals (10,000).
2. Legal Sources. (149-153) Since 1998, the Latvian Constitution
in Article 99 protects religious freedom and provides for the separation
of church and state: "Everyone has the right to freedom of thought,
conscience, and religion. The Church shall be separate from the State."
Much of the relevant Latvian law about religious activities is set out in
the Law on Religious Activities (the "Law"), first adopted by the
Latvian Parliament in 1995, and amended since then in 1996, 1997,
1998, and 2000. The Law is the only Latvian law set out in volume 2 of
the series. (163-176) Much of the Law is summarized and analyzed in
volume 1.
In 2000, as provided by the amended law, the Latvian Cabinet of
Ministers created what to the reader seems to be a rather powerful Board
of Religious Affairs (the "Board") which, in the words of Professor
Balodis, "implements state policy, coordinates religious affairs, manages
issues relating to the church-state relationship and evaluates the
effectiveness of regulations affecting religious practices." (149) The
Board may make proposals for protecting religious human rights
guaranteed under the Latvian Constitution and pursuant to Latvia's
international treaty obligations. The Board is subject to the supervision
of the Ministry of Justice. Religious institutions are not required to
register with the Board, but they may only take advantage of legal rights
and protections if they do so. The Board has the authority to reject a
registration application and has the power to ask the courts to restrain
religious organizations if they fail to coordinate their activities with
municipalities or to follow proper procedures in organizing public
events. Latvian law prohibits public broadcasting of political or
religious advertisements, except to give notice of the place and time of
religious events. There are also legal prohibitions on infringing
religious feelings, inciting religious hatred, and disturbing religious
rituals.
3. Freedom of Religion and Separation of Church and State. (153-
155) At the founding of the Latvian state in 1918, the national
inclination was to protect religious freedom, making it one of "the most
advanced in Europe" at the time. (153) Nowadays, reports Professor
Balodis, "religious freedom in Latvia is largely a reality-not just an
empty expression in the law." (153) However, in his view, "one of the
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major abuses of religious freedom stems from the principle, 'one church
for one confession."' (153) The Board rejects the registration of
alternative religious associations within what it deems a single faith e.g.
of Lutheran, Orthodox, Old Believer and Whitsunday congregations.
4. Legal Status of Religious Organizations. (156-158) The Board
is required to process registration applications within one month. If they
are approved, churches become not-for-profit organizations.
"[E]veryone in Latvia has the right to join a congregation." (157) All
registered churches must adopt statutes providing, for example, a
distinctive name, a commitment to follow Latvian law, and regular
procedures for membership and finance. Although outsiders sometimes
criticize the regulatory system imposed by the Board, Professor Balodis
supports the system: "Registration helps the state fulfill its basic
responsibilities in safeguarding religious freedoms." (158)
5. Financing of Churches. (158-161) Pursuant to the principles of
the Latvian Constitution, church funds are to be kept separate from state
financing. Churches may raise money and own property. Real property
owned by a church and used for religious purposes is free of property
tax. Companies and individuals contributing to a church are eligible for
tax relief. Tax relief may be denied by the Board if a church violates the
law. Churches must submit an annual financial report to the Board.
6. Religion and the Mass Media. (161-163) Religious literature
may be distributed only by religious organizations. In Riga, Latvia's
capital and largest city, there are two Lutheran bookstores, a Baptist
bookstore, and an inter-confessional bookstore. There are some thirty-
nine registered religious periodicals. There is no restriction on the right
of persons or organizations to propagate their religious views. However,
publication of views of religious superiority or intolerance are
prohibited.
7. Activities of Religious Organizations at Public Institutions.
(163-165) An Advisory Council of the Traditional Confessions (the
"Advisory Council") was established by the Latvian Ministry of Justice
in 1996. "The Advisory Council's purpose is to facilitate consensus and
understanding among representatives of different churches and followers
of different religious convictions." (163) Although the Advisory
Council has no formal authority, it may make non-binding
recommendations.
The Board, not the Advisory Council, is responsible for appointing
public chaplains. These include chaplains in the armed forces and at
public facilities such as airports and ports. Prison chaplains, however,
are appointed by the Prison Administration, which is part of the Ministry
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of the Interior rather than the Ministry of Justice, which is responsible
for the Board and the Advisory Council.
8. Labor Law. (165-167) Churches are subject to the same labor
law as any Latvian company. Accordingly, it is difficult to dismiss
religious employees. Refusing to recognize the distinctiveness of
religious employment, Latvian courts have held, respecting the dismissal
of church employees on grounds of "un-belief," that "reference to
religious conviction was false and could not justify non-compliance with
the labor law" and that "the Latvian Labor Law provided for no
exceptions with respect to religious organizations." (166) Professor
Balodis remarks that such decisions would not have been countenanced
in the earlier period of Latvian independence and have "adversely
affect[ed] the morale of the religious community." (166)
9. Religious Education in Schools. (167-169) Religious or ethical
instruction was compulsory in schools in Latvia's first independent
period, but all religious instruction in schools was prohibited during
Communist Russian occupation (1945-90). In 1990, immediately
following independence, Latvia again permitted religious instruction in
schools. Nowadays, it is available in state schools so long as at least ten
students wish it, but only for five faiths: Catholic, Lutheran, Orthodox,
Old Believer, and Baptist. Other religious groups, however, are
demanding that the government provide religious instruction. These
include the Muslims, Jews, Latvian pagans, and Methodists. Professor
Balodis believes that religious instruction in the state schools is actually
a violation of the principle of the separation of Church and State in the
Latvian Constitution; it is "a poorly considered state policy.. ." (169)
10. The Faculty of Theology at the State University. (170-171)
The Faculty of Theology, was effectively muted during the Soviet
occupation. It has been reborn and is now "a multi-confessional
institution providing the highest level of theological education." (171)
11. Matrimonial and Family Law. (171-172) During the Tsarist
Empire before 1918, there was no centralized marriage system, but the
Orthodox, Lutheran, and Catholic churches could all register marriages.
In Latvia's first independent period, ten churches were authorized to
register marriages; all marriages had to be reported to the state. Since
1993, Latvian law has permitted marriages to be registered either at the
Marriage Registry Office or with one of eight denominations: Lutheran,
Catholic, Orthodox, Old Believer, Methodist, Baptist, Seventh Day
Adventist, or Jewish. Nowadays, however, only one-third of registered
marriages are recorded in churches. Moreover, most marriages, as in
Scandinavia, are not registered at all in either a state office or a church
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but are simply consensual.
12. Conclusion: Future Perspective. (173-175) Many issues
remain. Should persons be permitted not to fulfill military duties
because of religious convictions? Should religious holidays be granted
to members of the Orthodox and Old Believer churches? Do Latvia's
laws about religious instruction violate the European Convention on
Human Rights? Does religious education in state schools violate the
Latvian Constitution? Should the Latvian labor law be reformed to take
special account of church employment? Similar useful detail and
helpful commentary are to be found throughout these two volumes,
which are a wonderful and thoughtful collection of seventeen country
studies. I could readily see using this book as a text in a course on
religion and the state/civil society.
Mark W. Janis t
t William F. Starr Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law, Hartford,
Connecticut.
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JOHN WITHERSPOON AND THE FOUNDING OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC. By
Jeffry H. Morrison. University of Notre Dame Press 2005. Pp. 220.
$22.50. ISBN: 0-268-03485-0.
Jeffry H. Morrison, Assistant Professor of Government at Regent
University, argues in this brief, abundantly-documented work, that John
Witherspoon (1723-94), Presbyterian pastor and president of the College
of New Jersey (Princeton University), though long ignored by historians
and Americans, has a legitimate claim to recognition as a founder of the
republic, indeed, as "a quintessential American founder." (128)
Witherspoon was born and raised in Scotland, educated at the
University of Edinburgh at the height of the Scottish Enlightenment, and
called to the presidency of the College of New Jersey in 1768 where he
served until his death. Perhaps best known as the only clergyman to
sign the Declaration of Independence, he sat in the provincial and state
legislatures of New Jersey, in the Continental and Confederation
Congresses, and in the New Jersey Convention that ratified the U.S.
Constitution.
As the foremost pastor in one of the most influential churches in
colonial America, Witherspoon was one of the most notable clergymen
of his era. His writings were far-ranging, including works in natural
philosophy (science), political economy, and moral philosophy.
Witherspoon linked private morality and public order, and he
encouraged pastors to watch over the personal lives of their congregants
for the public good. True religion, he held, contributed to virtue, and
virtue provided the foundation for a strong republic. While he insisted
that the state should not coerce individuals on matters of religion,
magistrates should, he believed, encourage religion, even to the point of
providing for public worship.
The College of New Jersey under Witherspoon was a nursery of
future political leaders including President Madison, Vice President
Burr, twenty-eight U.S. senators, forty-nine U.S. representatives, and
three Supreme Court justices. In his lectures on moral philosophy,
Witherspoon became the chief conveyor to America of the moral system
of Francis Hutcheson and the Scottish Common Sense Realism of
Thomas Reid and Dugald Stewart. This Scottish moral philosophy and
Common Sense epistemology would, thanks in large part to Princeton
graduates, come to dominate nineteenth century American culture.
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An early and enthusiastic supporter of American independence,
Witherspoon was named a delegate to the Second Continental Congress
in June 1776. He suggested that America was ordained by God for a
special mission and that American independence was God's plan for the
colonies. These religious claims were buttressed with the more secular
argument that independence reflected a natural progression in political
and economic development for America.
Witherspoon supported a permanent confederacy to promote
defense and ensure sectional and commercial harmony. Though he had
no direct role in writing the federal Constitution, he supported its
ratification and influenced James Madison and Alexander Hamilton, the
primary authors of The Federalist Papers. He was a significant player
in the formation of a national Presbyterian Church (with structural
similarities to the federal government), and was elected as the first
moderator of the General Assembly of that church in 1789.
In his adoption of Lockean social compact theory, Scottish
philosophy, Reformed Protestantism, and, to a lesser degree, classical
republicanism, Witherspoon reflected various intellectual influences on
the founding of America. For that reason, Morrison suggests,
Witherspoon provides a unique representation of "the American mind at
the founding[.]" (127)
Morrison does an admirable job of showing the connections
between Witherspoon's theological and philosophical commitments and
his political convictions. He seems, however, more at home when he is
discussing political rather than religious history. The claim, for
example, that "New Jersey was not easily identifiable with the religious
zeal that ignited the First Great Awakening in Massachusetts and
Connecticut" (47) would surprise Presbyterians, located primarily in the
Middle colonies, who divided in the 1740s over issues surrounding the
Great Awakening.
While Witherspoon's importance in religious and educational
circles has long been acknowledged, his significance as a founder of the
republic, as Morrison contends, has not been emphasized. His influence,
both as a major voice at critical junctures in the revolutionary era and
through those who studied under him, does merit his inclusion as one
(among many) founders of the republic. Morrison, however, rides his
thesis too hard in trying to elevate Witherspoon in the constellation of
the country's founders. While he was clearly a noteworthy individual,
Morrison's claim that Witherspoon was a "quintessential American
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founder" begins to strain. Even so, this is a useful study of the political
influence of a very significant eighteenth century Presbyterian
clergyman.
Bradley J. Longfieldt
t Dean and Professor of Church History, University of Dubuque Theological Seminary,
Dubuque, Iowa.
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THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION AND BIOTECHNOLOGY.- A SEARCH FOR PRINCIPLED
DECISION-MAKING. By George P. Smith, II. Springer 2005. Pp. 254.
$139.00. 109,00 E. ISBN: 1-402-03146-7.
Developments in biotechnology continue to prompt a range of
social concerns, and careful reflection on the social regulation of
biotechnology is still very much needed. Further, for those of us who
believe that religion has a place in the public square, reflection guided or
influenced by particular faith traditions holds considerable interest. For
these reasons, I turned to The Christian Religion and Biotechnology with
anticipation. For the reasons given below, I cannot wholeheartedly
recommend this book, but I applaud the author for taking on a difficult
task in a complex field.
A focus on Christianity, as opposed to a range of religious
perspectives, is clear from the title. In the introduction, Smith notes that
his focus is on the Roman Catholic tradition. However, it is not entirely
clear how that tradition shapes the analysis. Smith reviews papal
encyclicals and other pronouncements relevant to particular topics, but
his conclusions seem to reflect a commitment to some form of teleology
close to utilitarianism. For example, he states that evaluation of cases or
issues "can be undertaken by a template shaped by a balancing of costs
versus benefit." (37)
Concerning the relationship between religion and developments in
science and technology, Lisa Sowle Cahill has recently identified two
general postures:
While some thinkers are influenced by their settings to be more
concerned about the integrity of their shaping traditions and
values, and to resist what they perceive as threatening cultural
trends, others are more concerned about adequacy to contemporary
experience and challenges and welcome innovative practices.'
Judging by this book, Smith belongs in the latter category. One of his
overarching themes is how to render a pre-modern world view relevant
to the present. Smith identifies traditional ethical norms of fairness,
justice, love, and promotion of the integrity of the human person as
useful touchstones in framing guidelines, and he suggests that the aim of
1. Lisa Sowle Cahill, Theological Bioethics: Participation, Justice, and Change 16
(Georgetown U. Press 2005).
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minimizing or ameliorating suffering unites religion and medical
science.
Background chapters on the roles of law and religion in the "Age
of Biotechnology" are divided into short sections, in many cases no
more than two to three paragraphs in length. These chapters attempt to
capture quite a spectrum of material. The chapter on law, for example,
covers everything from the role of bioethicists as expert witnesses, the
general purposes of law, and the utility of a Biological Science Court to
weird adventures in cryobiology and cloning from the pages of the
National Enquirer and Sun. Unfortunately, the rapid review of much
disparate material gives these chapters a choppy quality.
Later chapters address specific areas of biotechnology, in
particular, technologically assisted reproduction, genetic engineering,
and the use of medical technology to postpone or cause death. Smith
seems generally to side with proponents of biotechnology, although at
times he recommends legal limits that he views as necessary to preserve
important social institutions (e.g. legal restrictions on unmarried
women's access to new reproductive technologies to preserve the
concept of marriage and the institution of the family). The following
statement is illustrative of Smith's overarching perspective on genetic
engineering: "If actions are undertaken and performed with the goal of
minimizing human suffering and maximizing the social good, then the
noble integrity of evolution and genetic progress will be preserved." (96)
His discussion of eugenics, in particular, exudes confidence in science-
driven "positive" eugenics, that is, the improvement of the species
through persuading people to make particular choices rather than
through coercion. No consideration of racist ideology clouds a
description of the history of such programs in the United States that
begins:
The noble ideals of positive eugenic programs sought to encourage
those with what were perceived as socially beneficial traits to
consider basic eugenic principles when choosing a marriage
partner and deciding family size. (151)
My reading of the work of Paul Lombardo and others has made me a
skeptic, but no doubt Smith is not alone in his optimism. 2
In several respects, this volume would have benefited from more
thorough editing. First, the experience of this reader would have been
greatly enhanced had the introduction or the background chapters been
focused on a clear presentation of a framework that would then guide
2. Scott Christianson, Bad Seed or Bad Science?, N.Y. Times B9 (Feb. 8, 2003).
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and give coherence to the discussion in the chapters focused on specific
aspects of biotechnology. Some of the elements of such a framework
can be discerned: the need for a better informed public and for
specialized courts to address legal issues related to science and
technology; a cost-benefit ethic that also somehow incorporates norms
of love, justice, and human dignity; and the benefits of excavating the
common foundations for religion and biomedical science as a basis for
mutual understanding. But these elements are not systematically
developed and integrated into a meaningful whole.
Second, in at least two instances, substantial portions of the text are
repeated nearly verbatim (14, 15, 66-68, 93-94), typographical errors are
not infrequent, and some of the statements are confusing or misleading.
For example, the Transgenic Animal Patent Reform Act is described as
passing in 1988, and some of the provisions of this "law" are then
described. (91) In fact, although the bill passed the House, it did not
pass the Senate, so it never became law. Elsewhere the author refers to
Louise Brown's "extracorporeal birth" (versus conception). (93)
Finally, parts of the book would have benefited from updating. For
example, one section concludes with a statement that initial clinical
trials of gene therapy "will focus" on treatment of adenosine deaminase
(ADA) deficiency and metastatic melanoma. The citation is to an article
from 1985. There is no mention of the first gene therapy trial in 1990,
involving patients with ADA. There is also no mention of the
subsequent experience with gene therapy research, including the death
of Jesse Gelsinger in 1999, an event of enormous importance not only
for gene therapy but also for the entire field of biotechnology. While
biotechnology is a moving target and any account is bound to become
dated in some respects shortly after publication, these omissions are
surprising in a volume with a publication date of 2005.
In sum, through the lens of both law and religion, Smith addresses
a broad range of phenomena. Indeed, the true target of his examination
appears to be what he describes as the core concern of bioethics: "the
technology of control of man's body, his mind and quality of life." (2)
This large ambition separates The Christian Religion and Biotechnology
from accounts that do no more than itemize technologies or regulatory
approaches and their respective pros and cons. It is to be hoped that
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other scholars exploring the nexus of religion, law, and biotechnology
will emulate Smith in this respect.
Mary Anderlik Majumder*
t J.D., Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Medicine, Center for Medical Ethics and Health
Policy, Baylor College of Medicine, Houston, Texas.
NONVIOLENCE AND PEACE BUILDING IN ISLAM. THEORY AND PRACTICE. By
Mohammed Abu-Nimer. University Press of Florida 2003. Pp. 233.
$55.00. ISBN: 0-813-02595-8.
Don't be put off by the prosaic title of this book. It's the kind of
label university presses like and academic professors propose so that
their works will be adopted for course use. And this is altogether
reasonable. But Mohammed Abu-Nimer's title does not begin to
indicate the rewards of this treasure house of research and wisdom. In
fact, I have added it to a list that the Center for the Study of Islam and
Democracy in Washington, DC, is recommending to the Undersecretary
of State for Public Diplomacy to be translated into Arabic, Persian, Urdu
and other major languages of the Muslim world. It is that good and that
important. There is simply no other work that combines a profound
treatment of the fundamental human values in Islam, as conceived by the
Prophet Muhammad and found in the Koran and traditions of the
Prophet, and the art and science of nonviolent peace building and
conflict resolution practice in Muslim societies.
Abu-Nimer tells us his goal early on.
The use of the sacred scriptures in this study is mainly intended to
support the assumption that Islam is a lived religion and tradition
that promotes peace building and the nonviolent settlement of
conflicts. I will endeavor to show how such practices can be
extended further in modem Islamic culture. Neither defensive,
apologist, nor proselytizing Islamic faith, this study seeks to
actively promote peace-building and nonviolence strategies and
values rooted in indigenous Islamic cultural and religious contexts,
focusing on the identification of Islamic values, rituals, stories, and
worldviews. (3)
As this review is being written, violent Muslim demonstrations
have been taking place in Muslim and European countries to protest the
publication in Danish and other European newspapers of cartoons
caricaturing the Prophet. Mobs have burned foreign embassies and
commercial buildings and police have killed more than a handful of
demonstrators. It's hard to imagine Muslim nonviolence these days.
But Abu-Nimer explains in detail what Muslims have to work with by
drawing on their religious values and culture, even though he admits that
they lack comprehensive knowledge of those values and the ability to
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Abu-Nimer makes extensive use of Abdulaziz Sachedina's The
Islamic Roots of Democratic Pluralism,' which has emerged as a classic
analysis of the human values in the Koran and early traditions of the
Prophet. He cites Sachedina saying that:
if Muslims were made aware of the centrality of Koranic teachings
about religious and cultural pluralism as a divinely ordained
principle of peaceful coexistence among human societies, then
they would spurn violence in challenging their repressive and
grossly inefficient governments. (20)
But one has to deal with the issue of Jihad today and the variety of
its interpretations. Some more conservative writers believe that Islam is
inherently violent, and not at all susceptible to exhortation to nonviolent
resolution of political conflict. The writings of the late Sayyid Qutb,
himself tortured in Egyptian jails, called for violence against Arab
regimes that he wrote could no longer be considered Muslim because of
their use of violence against their own citizens. Osama Bin Laden may
not have been tortured by the Saudi authorities, but he engaged in
violence enthusiastically against the Soviet forces in Afghanistan in the
1980s with weapons and support equally enthusiastically supplied by the
U.S. and its allies. Ayman al-Zawahiri, the Egyptian physician and
alleged number two to Bin Laden, was again beaten continuously by his
Egyptians jailers. Zawahiri was the founder of Egyptian Islamic Jihad
which he merged with Bin Laden's al-Qaeda. The use of revolutionary
violence is the heart and soul of these movements.
But these doctrines are not rooted in Islam. Certainly, the reality of
human recourse to violence and warfare was recognized by the early
Muslims. Pacifism was not an acceptable ideology. Abu-Nimer cites
AbdullahYusif Ali's commentary on Koranic verses about the use of
violence and war.
War is permissible in self-defense, and under well-defined limits.
When undertaken, it must be pushed with vigour (but not
relentlessly), but only to restore peace and freedom of worship of
Allah. In any case, strict limits must not be transgressed: women,
children, old and infirm men should not be molested, nor trees and
crops cut down, nor peace withheld when the enemy comes to
terms[.] (28)
Another aspect of reality, however, was that the founding philosophy of
Islamic warfare, specifically, for defense of the community, was over
1. Abdulaziz Sachedina, The Islamic Roots of Democratic Pluralism (Oxford U. Press
2000).
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the years more broadly interpreted. As political leaders pushed the
boundaries of the community-the Ummah-legal scholars found ways
to justify what was essentially imperial expansion of Islam, if often with
the support and even collusion of populations who despised their rulers.
The preoccupation of rulers and especially scholars in Islam was
not with war but with the pursuit of justice, an essential element of the
nonviolent pursuit of the resolution of conflict. Social justice is one of
the major goals of Islam. Peace-building for Muslims requires justice,
mercy, compassion, wisdom, service, faith and love. The dominant
values are social justice-for instance, the abolition of slavery and racial
prejudice-and the equality and innate value of all human beings in
God's eyes. The practical applications of these doctrines include
charity, which is called for at least twenty-five times in the Koran. The
Prophet was an orphan, and his concern for the weakest and most needy
in any community dominated his teaching. In this, he was very much
like Jesus in his commitment to the social gospel-blessed are the poor,
the meek, the sick, the hungry, the imprisoned and the naked in need of
clothing.
Abu-Nimer states it flatly:
According to Islam, a nation cannot survive without making fair
and adequate arrangements for the sustenance and welfare of all
the poor, underprivileged, and destitute members of every
community. The ultimate goal would be the elimination of their
suffering and poverty. (57)
Particular Islamic values that support a philosophy of conflict resolution
are the universality and dignity of humanity, the equality of all races,
ethnic groups and tribal identity groups, and the sacredness of human
life ("And if any one saved a life, it would be as if he saved the life of
the whole people.")'
Forgiveness plays a key role in the Koran and the Muslim value
system: "God fills with peace and faith the heart of one who swallows
his anger, even though he is in a position to give vent to it." 3 The great
commentator on the traditions of the Prophet, Ibn Is'haq wrote,
The Prophet always prayed when he was persecuted during the
Mecca period, [when the Muslims were persecuted intensely by
the pagans of the city] saying, "Forgive them, Lord, for they know
not what they do." (67)
2. Qur'an 5:32. (All citations from the Qur'an are from Abdullah YusufAli, The Meaning
of the Holy Qur'an 257 & 1256 (9 th ed. 1997 CE).).
3. Id. at 42:37.
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Perhaps Abu-Nimer, a Muslim, can be forgiven himself for not noting
that these exact words are attributed to Jesus as he hung on the cross and
asked God's forgiveness for the Romans who were killing him.
There is a chapter rich in description of traditional Arab-Muslim
mechanisms for dispute resolution. Long before the rise of Islam, the
custom of third party mediation and arbitration in individual and inter-
family or clan conflicts was well established. After Islam, the person
likely to be called to mediate was one with a strong reputation for moral
probity and religious piety. Apology and asking forgiveness has been a
key element of the traditional reconciliation process just as modem
political psychologists in conflict resolution contend today.
Traditionally, the perpetrator will apologize publicly to the victim and
ask his forgiveness. As Abu-Nimer explains,
Such an apology in itself restores the victim's [self-]respect and
brings shame on the offender, while at the same time reintegrating
the offender through his or her affirmation of the community's
social order and traditional values. (108)
The author tells of a special ritual for handling murder cases in parts of
North Africa. The perpetrator confesses his guilt and agrees to lie down
beside a sheep. A family member of the victim approaches the two with
the option of killing the man or the sheep. The sheep is always the
choice. However, as Abu-Nimer tells us,
the fact that the victim has had the opportunity to take revenge (but
decided to kill the sheep) restores the respect, dignity, and the
honor of the victim's family. Thus, they will not be socially
stigmatized as weak or unable to revenge their victim. (108)
There is a moving measure of wisdom among such people whom many
would call primitive.
Toward the end of the book, the author provides a case study on the
ambiguity of violence in the first Intifada that began in 1987. It is
nuanced and fascinating and much more than can be described in this
limited space. But as a brief example, there is the question of stone-
throwing by Palestinian youth. Clearly considered violence by the
Israelis and many Palestinians, Abu-Nimer found that at least some of
the stone throwers did not. The author quotes Ahmad saying, "The
stones are just to tell the soldiers what we want. You cannot talk to
machine guns. Stones are not violence." Ahmad continued, "We are
not afraid to die .... and we have heavy stones, we have our hands-
and we have guns. We have surrounded soldiers in our neighborhoods
many times, but we choose not to kill them." (141)
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The book concludes with guidelines for conflict resolution
interventions, emphasizing that Islam contains within its broad system of
social and ethical values the means for peace-building as well as
violence. And long-term conflict resolution, to be effective, must be
integrated with socioeconomic development projects so that material
incentives reinforce the instinct toward peaceful resolution of conflict.
This makes sense and ends a uniquely valuable contribution to the
world's knowledge of Islamic values and the place of conflict resolution
in Muslim societies.
Joseph V. Montvillet
t Diplomat in Residence, American University, Washington, D.C. Senior Fellow, Center
for World Religions, Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution, George Mason University, Arlington,
Virginia.
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WHY THE MEDIEVAL TRIAL OF JOAN OF ARC IS OF
PARTICULAR INTEREST TODAY
THE TRIAL OFJOANOFARC. By Daniel Hobbins. Harvard University Press
2005. Pp. 251. $24.95. ISBN: 0-767-401894-X.
Joan of Arc was a courageous and combative woman, a resistance
fighter who lived in a man's world during the Middle Ages. The official
records of her infamous trial in 1431 reveal peculiar traits of the
medieval legal system and of the women who lived in an era when
religion was a major preoccupation of the people and a significant
influence in the courts. Small, pious, and unaccustomed to the art of
combat, Joan of Arc continuously claimed she was driven by voices sent
to her directly from God to save France from English rule during the
Hundred Year's War. Despite her unimpeachable piety, virginity and
moral purity, her sacrificial loyalty to France, and her miraculous
bravery in combat, she was burned alive at the stake for wearing men's
clothing and for heresy! In fact, Joan of Arc was tried and unjustly
convicted in France by the very same Frenchmen whom she saved from
the dreaded English. No one came to her aid, not even the French King
Charles VII, whom Joan saved from the clutches of the English and the
apathy of the French and whom she brought to power through her own
vision and military leadership.
In his excellent work, The Trial of Joan of Arc, Professor Daniel
Hobbins has translated the court proceedings from Latin into English.
Hobbins is an Assistant Professor of History at the University of Texas
at Arlington. In his informative introduction, Professor Hobbins places
the trial in its legal and historical context, provides an overview of the
trial and its major players, discusses extensively the nature of the
inquisitorial procedure,' and explains how the trial records were
compiled. Hobbins also explores the woman, Joan of Arc, and her place
in fifteenth-century French society. For Hobbins, Joan was a product of
her times. Thus, it was not unusual for a pious woman to hear voices
from God. But wearing men's clothing and adopting the role of a
military leader was unusual in the Middle Ages and cost Joan her life,
1. See Henry Ansgar Kelly, Inquisitions and Other Trial Procedures in the Medieval West
(Ashgate Publg. 2001).
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even though she claimed that she had to wear these clothes to protect
herself from being raped by soldiers and ultimately by her jailers.
Hobbins also explains why there is a French and Latin version of
the trial transcript. The notary, Guillaume Manchon, and a Parisian
lawyer, Thomas de Courcelles, took notes quickly in French during the
trial. At the end of each day, they both compared notes and wrote the
official French Minutes of the day. Unfortunately, the original French
Minutes of the trial have disappeared and only two partial copies derived
from them have come down to us.2 These are known as the Orleans
manuscript ("0") located in the Biblioth&que Municipale in Orlans and
the Urfe manuscript ("U") located in the Biblioth~que Nationale in
Paris.
3
When and why did the Latin record of the court proceedings come
about? Soon after the end of the trial, the Chief Judge, Pierre Cauchon,
ordered Thomas de Courcelles and Guillaume Manchon to gather all the
documents relating to the trial, to translate the French interrogations into
Latin, and to put all this material in order as a new copy of the entire
proceedings. (5) This Latin text is more than just a compilation. It is a
highly mediated work of authorship, a narrative tissue weaving together
the French Minutes and the supporting documentation. (5) In other
words, it is a perfect law and literature text to be examined and
interpreted. Like Martin Luther King's Letter from the Birmingham
Jail,4 the Latin text was cast in the form of an open letter addressed "to
all who will read the present letter or public instrument." (5) The Latin
record "is a hybrid text that is both documentary and literary." (5)
Three of the five original Latin manuscripts survive, one by Jules-
Etienne Quicherat (1841-49), another by Pierre Champion (1920-21) and
the third by Pierre Tisset and Yvonne Lanhers (1960-71). (6)' Even
though the original Latin text was generated by Joan of Arc's opponents,
Hobbins prefers to work from the Latin text because, as he demonstrates
persuasively, it is more reliable than the French text for the following
reasons. The Latin text is an original manuscript composed immediately
after the trial. (8-9) The original French Minutes have disappeared. The
2. Karen Sullivan, The Interrogation of Joan ofArc 149 (U. Minn. Press 1999).
3. Two other versions of the French Minutes are available, one in French and one in
English: La Minute franqaise de l'Interrogatoire de Jeanne la Pucelle, d'apr~s le rnquisitoire de
Jean d'Estivet et les manuscripts de d'Urfr et d'Orlans (Paul Doncoeur & Yvonne Lanhers eds.,
Melun, France: d'Argences 1952) and Walter Sidney Scotts, The Trial of Joan of Arc; Being the
Verbatim Report of the Proceedings from the Orleans Manuscript (Associated Booksellers 1956).
4. See Susan Tiefenbrun, Semiotics and Martin Luther King's "Letter from Birmingham
Jail, "4 Cardozo Stud. L. & Literature 255 (1992).
5. Karen Sullivan, supra n. 2.
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claims made by Scott, the author of an English translation of the French
Minutes, that Pierre Cauchon deliberately ordered Courcelles to falsify
the Latin record in order to blacken the memory of the victim are
unsubstantiated. (9-10) Hobbins prefers to work with the official Latin
compilation because it includes many more documents than the French
Minutes: numerous letters, consultations, opinions of individual lawyers,
and conclusions of the faculty of theology and canon law at the
University of Paris. (10) The Latin text also includes the seventy
charges against Joan and her selected responses. But some people
concerned about the reliability of the Latin text remind us that
Courcelles, the Latin translator, was one of only three people who
recommended in favor of torture for Joan. (10) Hobbins even admits that
a few discrepancies between the French and Latin texts indicate a
possible attempt by Courcelles to modify Joan's testimony. (11) There
is also talk of conspiracy and cover-up by Courcelles and others placing
doubt on the reliability of the Latin text. (10-11) Nevertheless, Hobbins
demonstrates that the Latin text taken as a whole is more reliable than
the French Minutes.
If all these translated texts of the trial records are available, why do
we need Hobbins' new English translation? Without directly answering
this question, Hobbins explains that his English translation of the Latin
text is more reliable than a translation of the French Minutes and is more
convenient to use than the lengthy and complete English translation of
the Latin text by W.P. Barrett, The Trial of Jeanne d'Arc.6
The historic trial of Joan of Arc has fascinated writers for centuries.
Anatole France, Andrew Lang, Jules Michelet, Jules-Etienne-Joseph
Quicherat, Voltaire, Jean Anouilh, Mark Twain, Friedrich Schiller, and
George Bernard Shaw all wrote about the trial of Joan of Arc. Shaw
wrote a play about Joan's trial, Saint Joan, and also wrote an important
Preface to that play in which he brilliantly analyzes Joan's innocence or
guilt and the general failures of the legal system.7 As a law professor, I
plan to use Daniel Hobbins' book in my law and literature class when I
discuss George Bernard Shaw's work and the important legal issues
embedded in that text. In addition, I plan to refer my students to Daniel
Hobbins' book for my course on Women and International Human
Rights Law. The usefulness in a law school curriculum of this book
containing a competent translation of a medieval trial court record is
clear, especially if law scholars and teachers want to bring reality into
6. W.P. Barrett, The Trial of Jeanne d'Arc 3 (Gotham House 1932).
7. George Bernard Shaw, Saint Joan: A Chronicle Play in Six Scenes and an Epilogue
(Penguin Classics 2001).
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the classroom as well as history and comparative analysis.
The trial of Joan of Arc has particular relevance today when our
political leaders calmly sit around discussing justifications for the use of
torture and when outraged listeners accuse these leaders of being
"medieval." Daniel Hobbins' new English translation of the Latin
record of the court proceedings is a convenient resource for comparative
law discussions about medieval law, the procedure of ecclesiastical
trials, the difference between canon law9 and civil law, and the nature of
medieval trials in France.
What went wrong in Joan's trial? Joan of Arc's trial is considered
by many legal scholars to be a travesty of justice as well as a perfect
example of a medieval ecclesiastical trial conducted as an inquisitional
procedure characterized by secrecy and torture. l The trial was so unfair
that about twenty years later King Charles VII demanded a re-trial in
order to rehabilitate Joan of Arc's reputation as well as the reputation of
the King of France himself, who was crowned as a result of Joan's
superhuman efforts. In 1920 Joan of Arc was actually sainted, an ironic
reversal that sheds light on the unfairness of her trial.
Historians, lawyers, judges, writers, artists, and filmmakers all over
the world continue to be intrigued by the unfairness of the trial that may
reflect on our own modem-day trial procedures. The trial records reveal
the corruption and lack of independence of the judges. Joan is being
tried for heresy, and her judges are bishops. Joan is being tried for
wearing men's clothing when she saved France from being occupied by
the English, and her judges are pro-English. The Chief Judge, Pierre
Cauchon, was the Bishop of Beauvais, a paid advisor for the English
occupational government, and a careerist in search of a better post under
English rule. When Joan of Arc was captured in Compiegne, the
English paid handsomely to acquire her as a prisoner. The English paid
for the trial and its interrogations. They had a vested interest in her
conviction. Cauchon was in charge of the whole trial and worked with
8. E.g. Jess Braven, Leading The News: White House Will Reverse Policy Ban Evidence
Induced by Torture, Wall St. J. A3 (Mar. 22, 2006).
9. Canon law is defined as the legal institutions established by the Church in the twelfth to
the sixteenth century. Canon law includes the law of elections, complex rules of clerical
ordination, the remedy of restitution, the protection of the poor, the use of oaths and vows, the law
of property and economy, the law of baptism, the crime of blasphemy (or heresy), the protection
against double jeopardy, laws of papal privileges, the law of excommunication and religious
discipline. Canon law was considered to be the law of love and was instituted in contrast to
Roman civil law that was notorious in its brutality. See Review Essay: In the Steps of Gratian:
Writing the History of Canon Law in the 1990s, 48 Emory L. J. 647 (1999).
10. See generally Frank R. Herrmann, S.J. & Brownlow M. Speer, Facing the Accuser:
Ancient and Medieval Precursors of the Confrontation Clause, 34 Va. J. Intl. L. 481 (1994).
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the Inquisitor of France and over a hundred clerical legal assistants. To
the pro-English Chief Judge, Joan represented nothing less than the
enemy who wanted to give France back to the French. The record
reveals the political nature of the trial, the packing of the jury with
bipartisan members who were pro-Burgundian and in favor of English
rule, the brutality of the trial proceedings and interrogations, and the use
of threats and torture to extract a confession. It also illustrates the
overwhelming presence of Church doctrine during the trial, the unjust
conviction of the accused, the horrific nature of the sentence, as well as
the blatant disregard for the rights of the accused. Joan was denied the
right to counsel and the right to be confronted with the witnesses against
her. Joan did not even have the right to hear the seventy charges against
her that were eventually read aloud to her in a language she could not
understand. Moreover, the court clerk's notes were occasionally
falsified, the number of pro-English judges was arbitrarily increased,
and the public and secret interrogations were brutal and designed to
entrap Joan by forcing her to answer irrelevant questions destined to
exhaust the accused. 1 Even though Pierre Cauchon consistently and
painstakingly attempted to be procedurally correct throughout the trial in
order to withstand any objections regarding the unfairness of the trial,
the list of the procedural errors of this trial is overwhelming. A
discussion of these trial defects in a law class would be an effective tool
for learning the law and how it should work.
Susan Tiefenbrunt
11. Lucia A. Silecchia, Things Are Seldom What They Seem: Judges and Lawyers in the Tales
of Mark Twain, 35 Conn. L. Rev 559, 5599 (2003).
t Susan Tiefenbrun, Professor of Law, Director of Center for Global Legal Studies, Vice
President of the Law and Humanities Institute, Thomas Jefferson School of Law, San Diego,
California.
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HARDWIRED BEHA VIOR: WHAT NEUROSCIENCE REVEALS ABOUT MORALITY.
By Laurence R. Tancredi. Cambridge University Press 2005. Pp. 226.
$28.99. ISBN: 0-521-86001-6.
The field of neuroethics has been described as an amalgamation of
two branches of inquiry: the ethics of neuroscience and the neuroscience
of ethics. The ethics of neuroscience, which has received considerable
attention over the past three to four years, is concerned with the ethical
principles that should guide brain research and the treatment of
neurological disease, as well as the effects that advances in neuroscience
have on our social, moral, and philosophical views. The neuroscience of
ethics, which has received considerably less attention, may be described
as a scientific approach to understanding ethical behavior.1 Psychiatrist
and lawyer Laurence Tancredi makes a significant and early
contribution to the neuroscience of ethics in Hardwired Behavior: What
Neuroscience Reveals About Morality.
Tancredi begins by developing a historical framework for
understanding community notions of morality. Moral proscriptions on
behavior originated in ancient philosophy, were illustrated in classic
literature, and continue to be identified by the western Judeo-Christian
tradition and the religions of Islam and the Far East. Common precepts
of morality include bans on negative behaviors such as murder,
infidelity, greed, sloth, and manipulation. Sigmund Freud, Jean Piaget,
Lawrence Kohlberg, and other early experts in moral development
viewed these negative behaviors through the lens of mentalism, a focus
on the mind as separate from the brain and the body. Central to
mentalism are the concepts of free will and intentionality-the belief
that individuals can choose whether to engage in immoral acts.
Tancredi chronicles the transition from mentalism to physicalism,
which emphasizes the primacy of the physical brain. Although
physicalism dates back to Aristotle and the principles of natural law,
advances in neuroscience have brought it to the level of brain biology.
Tancredi's focus is the role of biology in immoral behavior, which he
examines through a series of case studies, beginning with infamous
Ricky Green. (46-68) Green, who had a long history of physical and
1. Adina Roskies, A Case Study of Neuroethics: The Nature of Moral Judgment, in
Neuroethics: Defining the Issues in Theory, Practice, and Policy 18 (Judy Illes ed., Oxford U.
Press 2006).
JOURNAL OF LA W & RELIGION
sexual abuse, sexually mutilated and killed at least two women and two
men. Tancredi avoids the nature-nurture dichotomy by suggesting that
Green's behavior resulted from a combination of selection factors (the
genetic capacity for transferring a trait) and instruction (an
environmental agent that triggers the innate capacity present in the
genes). (64-66, 81) Stated another way, Green's genes and biology
(including an ineffective limbic system and an abnormal prefrontal
cortex), as well as environmental influences, may have contributed to his
behavior.
Tancredi uses additional case studies and research findings to
further illustrate the role of the brain in moral decision-making. A case
study involving a failed heterosexual relationship is used to suggest that
men who have structural and functional abnormalities in the
orbitofrontal gyms, left superior frontal gyms, posterior cingulate gyms,
and superior temporal sulcus may have reduced capacity for empathy, an
essential component for developing a moral sense. (112) Hypersexuality
may result from damage to the limbic system, and poor financial
planning skills may be due to frontal lobe injury. The cases of Andrea
Yates, Susan Smith,2 Martha Stewart, and Enron allow for a discussion
of the role of the brain in cases involving "madness" and "badness," as
well as individual and corporate greed. Drawing on his experience as a
psychiatrist, Tancredi believes that criminal money-related behaviors
frequently stem from bipolar illness, obsessive-compulsive disorder, and
a pathological fear of failure--disorders involving major parts of the
brain, including the prefrontal and temporal lobes and the amygdala.
In his final chapter, Tancredi considers a hypothetical legislative
program set in the year 2100 that supports the use of functional
neuroimaging technology and brain treatments to curtail immoral
behavior, ensure acceptable expressions of sexual desires, and limit
wasteful spending activities, including gambling. Among other
measures, the hypothetical reforms require genetic and functional
neuroimaging testing of all babies to identify their potential range of
behavior, as well as the augmentation or replacement of the areas of the
brain that contribute to immoral decision-making. The program's
underlying assumption is that free will, if it exists at all, plays a minor
role in morality. Briefly switching approaches from the neuroscience of
ethics to the ethics of neuroscience, Tancredi compares the issues raised
2. Texas mother Andrea Yates, who suffered from psychotic hallucinations and delusions,
drowned her five children in a bathtub in 2001. South Carolina mother Susan Smith rolled her
Mazda-and her two children-into a lake in an attempt to secure the affection of her lover in
1995.
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by his hypothetical program to current questions relating to the proper
use of Prozac and Ritalin. Tancredi concludes by arguing that we need
to balance the merits of a moral (and monolithic) society against the loss
of individuality and diversity that could result from legislative reforms.
(171-172)
Scientists who believe that modem brain imaging techniques only
reveal the neural correlates of behavior, not the "hardwiring" of
behavior,3 may struggle with Tancredi's broad notion of defective brain
wiring. Other individuals may question the diminished role Tancredi
assigns to free will. Still others may disagree with Tancredi's
speculation that law enforcement agencies, educational institutions, and
the health care system will extensively incorporate neuroimaging
technology into their business processes. And, scholars in religion may
wish to inquire further about neuroscience's implications for religious
understandings of morality. However, Hardwired Behavior more than
accomplishes Tancredi's goal, which is to generate discussion about the
effect of recent neuroscientific findings on our moral and religious
precepts.
Stacey A. Tovinot
3. See e.g. Elizabeth A. Phelps & Laura A. Thomas, Race, Behavior, and the Brain: The
Role of Neuroimaging in Understanding Complex Social Behaviors, 24 Political Psychol. 747, 754
(2003) ("Showing a behavior 'in the brain' does not mean that it is innate, 'hardwired,' or
unchangeable.").
t Assistant Professor, Hamline University School of Law, St. Paul, Minnesota.
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LAWAND REVOLUTION II. THE IMPACT OF THE PROTESTANT REFORMATIONS
ON THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION. By Harold J. Berman. Belknap Press
of Harvard University Press 2003. Pp. xii+522. $52.50. ISBN: 0-674-
01195-3.
This is the second volume in Professor Harold J. Berman's
projected trilogy of works concerning the forces which have shaped the
western legal tradition. The first, Law and Revolution: The Formation
of the Western Legal Tradition' appeared in 1983. It won considerable
acclaim and gained for the author the 1984 SCRIBES Book Award of
the American Bar Association for the best new book on a legal subject.
It set out a clear and cogent argument that the western legal tradition had
been shaped by the Papal revolution in government which flowed from
the Hildebrandine reforms at the end of the eleventh century, reforms
which led to the creation not only of the canon law system of the
western Church but also to the development of constitutive legal systems
by secular rulers across western Christendom. The work exhibited
broad learning across the national and institutional boundaries which
had tended to confine the study of European legal history, and it also
challenged the chronology which had in large measure been accepted by
generations of historians writing not only of law but of European history
generally.
The current volume marks the turning of the author's attention
from the effect of the formation of the western legal tradition in the
reforms of Pope Gregory VII, to the transformation wrought by the
religious and political upheavals of the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries. He describes the changes wrought first by the Protestant
Reformation on mainland Europe which fractured the unity of Catholic
Christendom, and secondly by the English Revolution of the seventeenth
century, which Professor Berman argues should be taken to include the
entire period from the summoning of the Long Parliament in 1640,
through the Civil Wars and the Commonwealth, and on through the
years following the Restoration of the monarchy in 1660 to the so-called
"Glorious" Revolution of 1688-89. At that time, a new constitutional
and religious settlement was achieved, in what was shortly to become
1. Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition
(Harv. U. Press 1983).
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Britain, in the wake of James II's having to flee into exile.
Professor Berman's works are not only aimed at demonstrating the
importance of the central events described to the development of the
legal tradition which he argues they shaped. Candidly, he states that he
is promoting another agenda as well. He believes that the western legal
tradition is the product not merely of political, social and economic
forces, but also religious influences, which have not been accorded the
significant place due to them by much modern historical writing. He
states openly that he believes that
the rediscovery and revival of the historical connections between
the Western legal tradition and the Western religious tradition will
not only strengthen both but also facilitate dialogue and
cooperation among adherents of the major cultures of the world in
the development of universal legal standards and common legal
institutions. (xii)
He believes that a proper appreciation of the role of religion in shaping
western legal systems is vital in shaping the law of the future. Given the
author's candor, it is only proper that your reviewer should be equally
frank and state that this is a view with which he finds himself in entire
agreement.
The West which Professor Berman describes is essentially that part
of Christendom which was once united in its allegiance to the Catholic
Church, while for him tradition is "the sense of an ongoing historical
continuity between past and future," which in law manifests itself in the
"organic development of legal institutions over generations and
centuries, with each generation consciously building on the work of its
predecessors." (3) He approves of Jaroslav Pelikan's contrast between
traditionalism, the dead faith of the living, and tradition, the living faith
of the dead. The projected final volume of the trilogy is intended to be
an examination of the effects of the American, French and Russian
revolutions on the western legal tradition. One wonders whether in that
volume more attention will be given to Roman republican models in the
constitutional development of the western nations. Clearly, those
models cannot have been shaped by the Christian religious tradition of
the west, but their influence deserves to be considered even if any
decisive influence may be denied. There is something odd in the fact
that in anticipating his consideration of the American Revolution and
more particularly the French Revolution at the close of his Introduction,
Roman republican models are not even mentioned. Odd too is the claim
that "Soviet Marxist atheism was a Christian heresy." (18) While the
addition of the adjective "Soviet" might be pleaded as the decisive
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element in this phrase, the Marxist view of history has roots which lie
more in Judaism and the history of the people of ancient Israel than in
Christian doctrine, and Marx' own cultural background supports this.
The author divides his work into two parts, the first of which deals
with "The German Revolution and the Transformation of German Law
in the Sixteenth Century," while the second addresses "The English
Revolution and the Transformation of English Law in the Seventeenth
Century." The balance in the wording of the titles of these parts
continues into the structure of the sections, with successive chapters
dealing with an outline of the background history of each period, an
examination of the legal philosophy of the time, followed by four
chapters dealing in turn with the transformations in legal science,
criminal law, civil and economic law, and social law. This approach is
somewhat rigid, but ensures ease of reference for those whose interests
lie in particular aspects of Professor Berman's thesis.
The thrust of the first section of the volume is that the break from
Rome, which resulted from Luther's rebellion against the Catholic
Church, led to a transformation of legal arrangements in Germany, and
that Luther, and more particularly his followers, in accommodating this
transformation in their legal writings, in turn transformed western legal
science. The Papal Revolution of the twelfth century had resulted in a
Europe in which different legal systems addressed different facets of
individual and communal life. The punishment of serious wrongs
belonged to the royal jurisdiction; suits for land in the feudal.
Matrimonial and testamentary matters, together with the punishment of
sins, belonged to the Church courts, while matters relating to trade and
the affairs of merchants went to specialist mercantile tribunals. The
decision of some of the rulers of Germany to support Luther and thereby
deny the jurisdiction of the Catholic Church within their lands led
directly to a need to assimilate the former ecclesiastical jurisdiction
within their own "secular" order. Professor Berman emphasizes that this
was not a secularization of the Church's former jurisdiction; he argues
forcefully that it marked rather a spiritualization of the erstwhile
temporal jurisdictions of the German princes. In any event, the upshot
was the development of legal systems which embraced all aspects of
social life within one political and geographical jurisdiction.
Within these new comprehensive legal jurisdictions, the rulers were
bound to accommodate certain charitable endeavors which had
previously been the province of the Catholic Church. Thus, Professor
Berman provides interesting and valuable discussions of the
development of education and poor relief in the Protestant jurisdictions,
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and also examines how the theology of the reformers impacted upon the
law of marriage in the states within which their doctrines were accepted.
Professor Berman is perhaps at his best in the German part of the
volume when he considers the legal philosophy of the reformers and the
importance of their work to the development of legal science. He looks
in some detail at the writings of Melanchthon, Apel, Oldendorp, Lagus
and Vigelius. He claims for Apel the introduction of the distinction
between ownership and obligation in western legal theory, and a key
role in the development of systematic presentation. Lagus, he argues,
applied the traditional four causes of Aristotle to his legal analysis and
combined Roman and canon law in his works, producing compendia of
both civil and Saxon law. The author sees the distinction between
private and public law, as set out by Vigelius, as only becoming "basic
to legal analysis" at this time (124-125). The pride of place usually
accorded to French jurists, such as Hugh Doneau, in developing the civil
law is impliedly questioned; they are described as having applied
Melanchthon's topical method to the mass of legal materials in
Justinian' s texts.
Professor Berman has importantly presented his readership with an
account of the development of German legal science at this period which
corrects what has been a clear neglect. Nevertheless, your reviewer is
unable to accept all that the author claims. He is uneasy with Professor
Berman's emphasis on the unity of Germany at this time. It is
noticeable that, in comparison to France for instance, religious refugees
had merely to move from one territory to another, while in France, men
such as Calvin or Doneau had to flee the kingdom. Nor does Professor
Berman give due recognition to the manner in which the scheme of
Justinian's Institutes played a key role in the fresh systematization of
legal sources. He believes that the changes in religion shaped the
changes in the law and legal science, but does not give due weight to
how far the general questioning of received knowledge which was part
of the "spirit of the age"-leading to a need to reconsider basic ideas
such as the shape of the world and the shape of the universe-caused
questioning of existing structures in both religion and the law. This
despite the fact that he acknowledges that some key developments in
legal science in Germany, such as Schwarzenberg's Bambergensis,
antedated Luther's attack on the Catholic Church. Professor Berman's
thesis, however, is always clearly argued, often with considerable
passion, written-like the juristic works he describes-from the heart.
Turning to the English Revolution, Professor Berman lists among
its consequences the development of constitutional monarchy, a measure
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of religious tolerance, the development of the doctrine of precedent, the
adversarial style in procedure, and once more the emergence of a
comprehensive legal system. In legal science, he examines the works of
Fortescue, Hooker, Coke and Hale-the last-mentioned very much the
hero of the story, possibly as much for his life as for his work.
Collectively he believes they created an English tradition in legal
science which was a harbinger of what would later be termed historical
jurisprudence. The demise of the prerogative courts of Star Chamber
and High Commission, and the need to accommodate their work within
the jurisdiction of the common law courts, undoubtedly played a major
role in the shaping of much of English law thereafter, but to what extent
religious factors, particularly Calvinism, can be credited with a
significant part in this history is questionable. Nevertheless, Professor
Berman's view that the Calvinist theology of covenant influenced the
decision in Paradine v. Jane, that liability for breach of contract was
strict, remains interesting.
Professor Berman is again convincing when he argues that in
England as in Germany, the changes which flowed from religious
reformation spiritualized the secular order rather than secularized the
spiritual, although this seems more true of the Tudor and early Stuart
reigns than of the post-Restoration period. Poor relief, he argues,
contrary to the views of some Marxist historians, was not grounded in
economic motives, but undertaken, as Hale wrote, because it was in
accordance with God's will, exhibited common humanity and was sound
social policy.
As with the first volume, the breadth of Professor Berman's
analysis occasionally leaves the reader uneasy with regard to his grasp
of some of the detail, and there are pitfalls for the unwary. Some errors
are probably typographical-Philip II was not king of Spain in 1640
(204) and Littleton did not write his Tenures in the sixteenth century
(294); others are not. The comments on the Roman law of contracts
(156-57), the description of the decision in Slade's case (338), and the
dating of the introduction of judicial divorce into England (353) are all
misleading. The distinction between murder and manslaughter based on
killing in hot blood went back to the sixteenth century. (325-326) The
treatment of the common law's use of legal fictions strains the author's
argument. (280) Less importantly, the continual reference to the pre-
Reformation Catholic Church as "Roman Catholic" irritates.
Despite these caveats, Professor Berman's work is one which
cannot in the future be ignored by those who seek to understand the
development of law and of the idea of law in the western world. That he
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has brought the juristic work of the German Protestant reformers into the
limelight in itself is deserving of gratitude. At the end of the volume,
the author responds to the charge that he has confused history with
prophecy. Professor Berman rightly refuses to demarcate so sharply
between the two vocations. His own work is prophetic in the best sense;
he interprets events in the light of experience in order to enable sound,
informed choices to be made for the future. It is a worthy contribution
to the tradition it describes.
Thomas Glyn Watkin t
t Professor of Law and Head of the School of Law, University of Wales, Bangor.
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